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Abstract
This paper presents results of an experiment testing how the personality dimension
agreeableness interacts with different organizational factors to affect the strategy chosen when
entering a budget negotiation. Prior budget research suggests firms invite subordinates into
budget negotiations primarily to elicit private information from subordinate managers. However,
criticism of traditional budgeting processes suggests subordinates will act strategically in such
negotiations, limiting the effectiveness of inviting managers into budget negotiations. This study
hypothesizes the factors most criticized, including budget targets in performance evaluation, will
interact with certain organizational factors, connectedness of organizational units, and an
individual personality dimension to significantly affect the amount of information managers
share through the choice of negotiation strategy. Results indicate such interaction may impact
how and to what extent information is shared in the budget negotiation, suggesting important
implications for how budget managers approach budget negotiations.
Keywords: budget, budget negotiation, personality, participative budgeting
Introduction
While budgeting generally, and subordinate involvement in budget preparation in
particular, have been one of the most researched topics in management accounting (Shields and
Shields 1998), the area remains largely unsettled (Derfuss 2016). In particular, how and to what
extent factors related to the budget development process address the fundamental agency
problem of eliciting private information from subordinate mangers (agents) remains unresolved
(Brown, Evans Iii, and Moser 2009). Eliciting such information to better manage organizational
planning is a fundamental reason firms invite participation in the budgeting process (Shields and
Shields 1998). However, critics, most notably the Beyond Budgeting Roundtable, argue
traditional budgeting practices incentivize participating mangers to use their private information
strategically for personal advantage, harming firm efficiency and profitability (Libby and
Lindsay 2010). Given this, adding to the understanding of factors influencing such information
sharing would significantly contribute to both academia and practice.
This paper reports the results of an experiment exploring how personality affects
subordinate response to two structural factors around the budget negotiation process: the degree
of budget focus in performance evaluation and the level of interdependence between
organizational units. An interaction between these factors and the personality dimension
agreeableness, part of the “Big Five” personality framework, affecting the intention of pursuing
integrative negotiation strategies is hypothesized.
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Integrative strategies approach negotiation with a “win-win” perspective. They require
the negotiator to more openly provide private information to achieve optimally beneficial
negotiation outcomes for all parties. Generally integrative strategies produce better overall
outcomes, but are used less often than distributive strategies, which approach negotiation as a
win/lose proposition, due to the greater effort and trust required of integrative strategies
(McCracken, Salterio, and Schmidt 2011; Neale and Bazerman 1985).
Since a primary reason firms involve subordinate managers in the budgeting process is
for those managers to provide information to better coordinate firm interdependencies (Shields
and Shields 1998), the implicit goal of initiating budget negotiations is to prompt the utilization
of integrative negotiation strategies. Use of integrative negotiation strategies increases the flow
of information during the budgeting process, resulting in improved firm planning and control.
Therefore, factors which affect the intention to utilize integrative negotiation strategies during
budget negotiations should be of ample interest to the accounting discipline.
Results of the experiment indicate a moderating relationship between the personality
dimension agreeableness and the aforementioned structural factors impacting the intent to utilize
an integrative negotiation strategy. Certain combinations correlate with a reduced intent, while
others correlate with a greater intent. Such insights aid practitioners in better approaching
budget negotiations to advance planning and control, and advance the academy’s understanding
of the budgeting process.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A review of relevant literature related to
budget negotiation and personality along with research hypotheses is presented in the section
“Theory and Hypotheses.” The section “Methodology” then describes the experiment
performed. Results and hypotheses tests are presented in the section “Results.” Implications and
limitations of the experiment are presented in the section “Discussion and Limitations.”
Theory and Hypotheses
Budget Negotiation
Budgets routinely function as a central component of planning and control systems
(Arnold and Gillenkirch 2015; Covaleski, Evans Iii, Luft, and Shields 2003). However, the use
of budgets for both planning and control purposes creates conflicting pressures and incentives
within organizations (Libby and Lindsay 2010). Planning functions require an open exchange of
information to develop accurate forecasts and optimally coordinate organizational
interdependencies. Control, particularly performance evaluation, incentivizes less open
exchange. Subordinates held accountable for performance against a budget target may attempt to
obtain easier targets by sharing, or witholding, information strategically (Libby and Lindsay
2010).
Of particular concern in budgeting research has been how the structure of the budgeting
process affects the sharing of information from subordinate to superior. Agency theory posits
that subordinates will use the information assymetry created by the presence of subordinate
private information to obtain favorable performance contracts. Given this, superiors utilize the
budget contract and budget setting process to incentivize the subordinate to share private
information. More complete and accurate information improves organizational planning, and
enables managers to craft optimal incentives for performance evaluation and control. (Brown et
al. 2009; Derfuss 2016; Sprinkle, Williamson, and Upton 2008).
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In practice, the process of engaging subordinates and crafting a budget is conducted
through negotiation (Fisher, Frederickson, and Peffer 2000). Recent budget negotiation research
has suggested subordinates do act strategically within the negoticaion process (Fisher, Peffer,
Sprinkle, and Williamson 2015); however, subordinates routinely do not claim as much slack as
possible in budget negotiations (Brown et al. 2009). Understanding the factors which drive how
and to what extent subordinates share private information remains a largely underdeveloped area
of management accounting research.
Negotiation Strategy
While budget negotiation research has suggested subordinates act strategically in their
negotiations (Fisher et al. 2015), this line of research primarily focusses on whether negotiations
end in agreement, or assignment of a budget by the superior (Fisher et al. 2000; Fisher,
Frederickson, and Peffer 2006; Fisher, Maines, Peffer, and Sprinkle 2002). This approach fails
to consider the myriad components which comprise the negotiation process. Such factors can
affect a negotiator’s willingness to share information.
Specifically, the negotiation strategy a participant chooses will guide whether
information is shared freely or shared strategically to gain an advantage. Negotiation strategies
fall into two broad classifications: integrative or distributive. When pursuing an integrative
negotiation strategy, a negotiator attempts to find an outcome where all parties get as much of
what they desire from the negotiation as possible. In contrast, a negotiator pursuing a
distributive negotiation strategy tends to view the interaction through a framework where any
gain for the other party results in reduced outcome for themselves. The strategy a negotiator
chooses will have a substantial impact on how he shares information, and has been consistently
shown to significantly impact the ultimate negotiation outcome (Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007;
Gibbins, McCracken, and Salterio 2010; McCracken et al. 2011; Neale and Bazerman 1985).
Typically, negotiators default to pursuing distributive negotiation strategies. Such
strategies are appropriate for many typical negotiation situations, such as haggling over a price.
Moreover, such strategies require less cognitive effort, viewing the negotiation as a fixed set of
factors, and only require the negotiator consider their own outcome (Neale and Bazerman 1985;
Thompson 2000).
Primary tactics utilized by negotiators pursuing a distributive strategy include
contending, compromising, and conceding. Contending tactics attempt to aggressively assert
claim to as much of the negotiation set as possible and force concessions from the other party.
Making a low offer price when negotiating the purchase price of a car would be a contending
tactic. Compromising strategies attempt to find a middle ground between the parties. “Split-thedifference” type strategies would fall in this classification, where the parties each make some
concessions to find an agreeable resolution. Lastly, conceding strategies involve making a
strategic concession from one’s position to benefit the other party. Such strategies reduce the
negotiators claim on the negotiation area, but the concession can prompt concessions from the
other party, moving the negotiation toward an agreement. For instance, a car salesman might
offer a longer loan term, prompting the buyer to accept a higher purchase price (Esser and
Komorita 1975; McCracken et al. 2011; Thompson 2000).
In contrast, negotiators pursuing an integrative negotiation strategy view the area of
possible agreement as flexible. Most commonly these strategies involve expanding the agenda
and/or problem solving. Expanding the agenda strategies involve bringing more issues into the
negotiation area, allowing parties to make beneficial trade-offs. This allows parties to make
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concessions on issues of low importance to them, but which hold greater importance to other
parties. For instance, a car salesman might offer free carwashes and coupons for a percent off
service work with the car purchase. By bringing factors beyond the price and loan terms into the
negotiation, each side can obtain more of what they desire in the negotiation outcome while
conceding areas of less importance to them. Problem solving strategies involve the parties
finding alternative routes to each negotiator’s desired outcome. This strategy, like expanding the
agenda, involves finding win-win trade-offs. However, instead of increasing the negotiation area
negotiators look more intently at the possible trade-offs to find areas which the parties value
differently. In the car purchase example a salesman pursuing a problem solving strategy would
first seek to fully understand the car purchaser’s circumstance and needs, and then seek to find a
way to meet those while generating the required profit (Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007;
McCracken et al. 2011; Thompson 2000).
Accountants tasked with negotiating budgets for their organization have substantial
interest in the negotiation strategies employed. If negotiation partners pursue an integrative
negotiation strategy more information will be offered, improving planning and control, and
allowing more optimal performance incentives to be developed. However, budget negotiations
contain unique features which could affect the negotiation strategies chosen. Budget
negotiations conclude with performance goals for which parties are responsible (budget targets)
instead of a transaction (like the purchase of a car). Even more, the subordinate party will
typically be held accountable for meeting the agreed-upon target. As budget critics contend,
such accountability incentivizes budget negotiators to act strategically and claim as much benefit
as possible (Libby and Lindsay 2010).
The outcomes of budget negotiations may also impact other units in the firm beyond
those of the negotiating parties. The realization that an agreement impacts other parties would be
expected to prompt greater consideration of the affected parties. Such realization may affect
how parties approach the negotiation. In circumstances with greater interdependence, where the
outcome of a negotiation has impact beyond the immediate negotiator, the knowledge of that
greater span of impact would be expected to induce greater use of integrative negotiation
strategies and less use of distributive strategies (DeRue, Conlon, Moon, and Willaby 2009; Pruitt
1983). In contrast, circumstances with lower interdependence, where the negotiation outcome
only affects the immediate participants, would likely incentivize use of more distributive
negotiation strategies. For example, in a budget negotiation a business unit manager who only
sees his unit’s interests would be expected to claim as many resources as possible to improve his
unit’s position. Any gain surrendered worsens the unit’s position without any obvious benefit,
thus the utilization of distributive strategies to approach the negotiation as a win-lose exercise is
the most logical choice.
However, in a budget negotiation with greater interdependence between business units, a
business unit manager may well see the interaction differently. In such a circumstance the
manager is aware that the outcome of the negotiation will impact other parties not directly
involved in the interaction. The outcome could inform planning for stages of production after
his. Alternatively, excess resources claimed by his unit could restrict the availability of
resources for other units. The realization of other stakeholders whose well-being is impacted by
the outcome of the unit manager’s negotiation logically changes the strategy selection. The
unit’s well-being remains a central concern, but the impact of the negotiation outcome on other
stakeholders’ well-being factors into strategy selection as well.

25

Stearns
Additionally, individual differences between negotiators may impact how these structural
factors affect negotiation strategy selection. Ultimately negotiation and the choice of negotiation
strategy is a behavioral choice. Certain personalities are driven more strongly by reward. Other
personalities gravitate toward supporting others more naturally (Goldberg 1990; Judge 2002).
The particular configuration of an individual’s personality would be expected to affect the type
of negotiation strategy to which they gravitate and are ultimately most comfortable pursuing in a
given situation (Dimotakis, Conlon, and Ilies 2012).
Personality and Negotiation
Increasingly, the generic negotiation literature has returned to the notion negotiation is an
inherently behavioral endeavor, and individual differences (personality) affect how a person
approaches the interaction (Dimotakis et al. 2012; Sharma, Bottom, and Elfenbein 2013). In this
line of research personality factors typically function as an intervening variable moderating the
impact of other variables influencing an individual’s approach to negotiation. One particular
personality dimension which has been shown to influence negotiation behaviors in the generic
negotiation literature has been “agreeableness” (Dimotakis et al. 2012).
Agreeableness is one of the personality dimensions articulated in the “Big 5” model of
personality (Goldberg 1981, 1990). While numerous models of personality have been
propagated in academic research, the “Big 5” has ascended as a broadly accepted model of
personality (Digman 1990). The “Big 5” posits that all individual differences can be categorized
into five broad dimensions of personality: extraversion, conscientiousness, neuroticism,
agreeableness, and openness to experience (McCrae and Costa 1985).
Within the Big 5 framework every individual possesses some measure of all five
dimensions. However, an individual’s typical behaviors will reflect the dimension(s) the
individual possesses most prominently (DeYoung, Quilty, and Peterson 2007). Thus, someone
characterized as highly agreeable would possess some measure of the other four dimensions:
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to experience, but rate higher on the
agreeableness dimension than the other four and predominantly demonstrate behaviors
associated with this dimension.
Highly agreeable individuals tend to demonstrate substantial care for others along with a
distinct disdain for conflict. Typical descriptors attached to highly agreeable individuals include:
kind, caring, altruistic, tender, compassionate, cooperative, compliant, and meek. Highly
agreeable individuals gravitate toward supporting others and prefer to avoid interpersonal
conflict (Barrick, Mount, and Judge 2001; DeYoung et al. 2007; Goldberg 1992; Judge 2002;
Judge, Simon, Hurst, and Kelley 2013).
Organizational behavior research suggests personality dimensions act as behavioral
preferences which are activated by environmental opportunities (called “trait activation” in the
literature) (Barrick et al. 2001; Barrick and Mount 1991, 2005). Trait activation occurs in
moderately strong circumstances, when an interaction is salient enough to warrant a response,
but not so intense the circumstance demands a particular response. Such circumstances allow for
the expression of greater individuality and the exercising of individual preference (Dimotakis et
al. 2012).
As stated earlier, the dimension of agreeableness has been shown to have moderating
impacts in negotiation strategy selection and outcome (Dimotakis et al. 2012; Sharma et al.
2013). Highly agreeable individuals tend to be very sympathetic to others, altruistic, meek, and
generally relationship oriented (Digman 1990; Goldberg 1990; McCrae and Costa 1985).
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Generic negotiation research has shown agreeable individuals to generate lower outcomes in
more competitive, distributive negotiations. Conversely, the natural other-focus of agreeable
individuals would tend to be an asset in more integrative negotiations (Dimotakis et al. 2012;
Sharma et al. 2013).
The unique characteristics of budget negotiation may prompt agreeableness trait
activation and affect how highly agreeable individuals approach a budget negotiation. Generic
negotiation research suggests accountability for results can create the necessary salience within a
negotiation to prompt trait activation (Pruitt 1983). Second, greater interdependence within an
organization would likely activate an agreeable individual’s other-focused tendencies (Pruitt
1983).
Thus, one would expect agreeable individuals to be more likely to pursue other-focused
integrative negotiation strategies in highly interdependent organizations; although, a budget
focused performance evaluation may be necessary to make the budget negotiation sufficiently
salient to evoke such differences. However, agreeable individuals’ other-focused tendencies
may also work against prompting some integrative negotiation strategies. While a problemsolving negotiation strategy points toward cooperation and collaboration, an expand-the-agenda
type strategy requires greater assertiveness and potentially requires challenging one’s negotiation
counterpart to consider options outside the initial negotiation set. Such assertiveness would
likely prove uncomfortable for highly agreeable individuals, particularly when the counterpart is
an authority figure. Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated (stated in alternate form):
H1: Highly agreeable individuals will be significantly less likely than other individuals
to pursue an expand-the-agenda negotiation strategy in a highly interdependent circumstance.
H2: Highly agreeable individuals will be significantly less likely than other individuals
to pursue an expand-the-agenda negotiation strategy in a highly interdependent circumstance
with high accountability.
H3: Highly agreeable individuals will be significantly more likely than other individuals
to pursue a problem solving strategy in a highly interdependent circumstance.
H4: Highly agreeable individuals will be significantly more likely than other individuals
to pursue a problem solving strategy in a highly interdependent circumstance with high
accountability.
Methodology
Setting
This study examines a setting in which a business unit manager must prepare for an
upcoming budget negotiation with senior management. Specifically, participants adopted the
role of unit manager of a regional lawn care service company. The lawn care industry was
chosen because it should be generally relatable to the majority of participants and added a layer
of richness to make the case more realistic and engaging for participants.
Participants
The case study and survey questionnaires were initially pilot tested with undergraduate
business students. Pilot test results showed effective experimental manipulations and
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questionnaire delivery. Students received extra credit in an accounting class for participating in
the pilot test.
Participants for the experiment were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
crowdsourcing marketplace. Recent research suggests participants recruited through a service
like Amazon’s MTurk marketplace are at least as good a proxy for the general working populace
as students, and possibly better (Buchheit, Doxey, Pollard, and Stinson 2018). An MTurk task
was submitted requesting 100 observations. Participants responding to the task were linked to on
online survey. Participants read one of four scenario manipulations and then answered questions
about their likelihood to use various negotiation strategies in the upcoming budget negotiation.
Of the 100 responses solicited, 94 usable responses were obtained. The 6 unused
responses all failed to complete significant portions of the experimental questionnaires and/or
significantly failed manipulation checks. Participants who successfully completed all
components of the questionnaire received a code to input in the MTurk system to receive
compensation for completing the task.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four case manipulations. Interdependence
and budgetary performance evaluation focus (accountability) were each manipulated at two
levels (high and low) creating a 2 X 2 fully crossed experimental design. In the high
interdependence manipulation individual units were supported by shared services for a variety of
specialty work requiring specific skills, often requiring licenses, and/or specialty equipment.
The case highlighted that the quantity of such resources was limited and if a unit planned for
greater quantities than necessary access to these resources would be limited to other units. In the
low interdependence manipulation such specialty services were acquired by each unit contracting
with specialty providers and the unit was responsible for correctly forecasting and managing its
use of such services. In the high budget performance evaluation focus the firm measures several
factors for performance evaluation of unit managers, but considers meeting budget targets the
primary responsibility of unit managers. In the low budget performance evaluation manipulation
meeting budget targets is one of several measures used to assess unit managers, but is not
considered more significant than other measures.
After reading the case scenario participants indicated how likely they would be to use a
series of negotiation strategies. Each strategy statement was accompanied with a 5-point Likert
scale anchored with “Very Unlikely” and “Very Likely.” Participants indicated their likelihood
of using a particular strategy by selecting the point which best fit their intentions. The strategy
options were adapted from Gibbins, McCracken, and Salterio (2010). This instrument is drawn
from a long established and validated inventory of negotiation strategies (Goodwin 2002;
Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders 2010; Rahim 1983; Rahim and Magner 1995). Minimal editing
was performed to fit the particulars of this case. Editing did not change essential wording, but
did alter specific names to fit the scenario presented.
The instrument consists of 25 statements reflecting five negotiation strategies. Two
strategies reflect integrative approaches: expand the agenda and problem solving. The other
three strategies reflect distributive approaches: contend, concede, and compromise. Although
the distributive strategies are not considered in the hypotheses postulated, data was collected
regarding them. The ten statements from the instrument reflecting the two integrative strategies
of interest in this study follow.
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−
−
−
−
−

−
−
−
−
−

Statements used to assess Expand the Agenda negotiation strategy intention were:
I would attempt to bring additional issues to the discussion, such that I could trade off on
these issues to resolve this issue in my favor
I would attempt to find other issues with management, so I could accede to their wishes
at the same time as achieving my position on this issue
I would provide all relevant information to management so we could solve this issue
together in the context of other issues
I would attempt to find other issues with management, which would add to the discussion
I would try to work with management to develop a proper understanding of this issue in
the context of other issues
Statements used to assess Problem Solving negotiation strategy intention were:
I would collaborate with management to come up with a new solution acceptable to both
of us
I would try to work with corporate management to find new solutions to this issue that
satisfy both our expectations
I would try to investigate the issue further with corporate management to find a new
solution acceptable to both of us
I would try to bring all my concerns about this issue out into the open with management
so that the issue could be resolved in the best possible way
I would try to integrate my ideas about how to resolve this issue with corporate
management to come up with a new solution jointly

After completing the negotiation strategy assessment participants completed a short
manipulation check of the experimental manipulations and then asked to respond to a 100-item
personality assessment adapted from DeYoung et al (2007). The 100 items consisted of
individual statements describing specific characteristics. Participants were asked to rate how
well each statement described themselves. No changes in wording were made. Participants
responded on a five-point Likert scale, as with prior experimental questions. The scale was
anchored with “Very Inaccurate” and “Very Accurate.” The twenty statements relating to the
agreeableness personality dimension adapted from DeYoung et al. (2007) are:
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−

Am not interested in other people’s problems (reverse coded)
Feel others’ emotions
Inquire about others’ well-being
Can’t be bothered with other’s needs (reverse coded)
Sympathize with others’ feelings
Am indifferent to the feelings of others (reverse coded)
Take no time for others (reverse coded)
Take an interest in other people’s lives
Don’t have a soft side (reverse coded)
Like to do things for others
Respect authority
Insult people (reverse coded)
Hate to seem pushy
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−
−
−
−
−
−
−

Believe that I am better than others (reverse coded)
Avoid imposing my will on others
Rarely put people under pressure
Take advantage of others
Seek conflict (reverse coded)
Love a good fight (reverse coded)
Am out for my own personal gain (reverse coded)

Finally, demographic and work experience data was collected. Participants then received a code
which they provided in the Amazon MTurk system to receive compensation.
Analysis and Measures
Hypotheses for this study are assessed performing a 2X2X2 ANOVA. Organizational
interdependence (Interdep) was manipulated at HIGH (1) and LOW (0) levels. Similarly, budget
performance evaluation (PerfEval) focus was also manipulated at HIGH (1) and LOW (0) levels.
Agreeableness was measured with 20 statements assessed on a 5-point Likert scale. Initial
assessment of the Agreeableness variable indicated some deviation from normality. Rather than
perform a transformation, since the hypotheses lent themselves to analysis with an ANOVA, a
median split was performed transforming the responses into a categorical variable (AGRSPL)
with HIGH (1) and LOW (0) classifications. To code the median split all observations were
sorted by the value of the Agreeableness variable (high to low), the half of observations with the
highest scores were assigned to the HIGH (1) coding and the remaining observations, the half
with the lowest values on the Agreeableness variable were coded to the LOW (0) classification.
Thus, the strength of the Agreeableness dimension of all 94 usable responses was assessed. The
half showing the strongest intensity were coded as HIGH, and the half of responses showing
lower strength were coded LOW. ANOVA analysis also requires homogeneity of variance,
normality, and independence of observations. No violations of these requirements were
observed.
Separate ANOVAs were run for each of the two integrative strategies tested: expand the
agenda and problem solving. Tables 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics and ANOVA results
with the expand the agenda strategy as a dependent variable. Tables 3 and 4 report the
descriptive statistics and ANOVA results with the problem solving strategy as the dependent
variable.
Test of Hypotheses H1 and H2
Hypothesis H1 predicted a 2-way interaction between the personality variable
agreeableness and the degree of interdependence within organizational units with the likelihood
of utilizing an “Expand the Agenda” integrative negotiation strategy. Table 2 presents the “Test
of Between Subjects Effects” results of a 2X2X2 ANOVA run in SPSS. Support for H1 would
indicate the mean likelihood for participants in the HIGH interdependence condition who also
exhibited HIGH levels of agreeableness were significantly less likely to pursue an expand the
agenda negotiation strategy than other participants.
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Results
Table 1

PerfEval

Interdep

0

0

1

Total

1

0

1

Total

Total

0

1

Total

Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Expand
AGRSPL
Mean
Std. Dev

N

0
1
Total
0
1

3.614286
4.036364
3.800000
3.925000
3.214286

.568205
.527774
.580230
.692305
.480156

14
11
25
8
14

Total
0
1
Total
0
1
Total
0
1

3.472727
3.727273
3.576000
3.646809
3.815385
3.672727
3.750000
3.766667
3.563636

.651870
.618894
.643739
.629993
.395487
.781141
.593442
.416333
.697528

22
22
25
47
13
11
24
12
11

Total
0
1
Total
0
1
Total
0
1

3.669565
3.792000
3.618182
3.710638
3.711111
3.854545
3.775510
3.830000
3.368000

.564426
.397827
.724823
.574545
.494067
.676635
.581138
.532225
.599110

23
25
22
47
27
22
49
20
25

Total
0
1
Total

3.573333
3.761702
3.595745
3.678723

.609918
.508430
.675650
.600515

45
47
47
94
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Table 2
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Expand
Type III Sum
of Squares
Corrected Model
5.452a
Intercept
1250.861
PerfEval
.001
Interdep
.639
AGRSPL
.574
PerfEval * Interdep
.178
PerfEval * AGRSPL
.005
Interdep * AGRSPL
2.031
PerfEval * Interdep *
1.641
AGRSPL
Error
28.086
Total
1305.640
Corrected Total
33.537
Source

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.779
1250.861
.001
.639
.574
.178
.005
2.031

2.385
3830.220
.004
1.956
1.758
.546
.014
6.220

.028
.000
.953
.165
.188
.462
.905
.015

1

1.641

5.025

.028

Partial Eta
Noncent.
Squared
Parameter
.163
16.694
.978
3830.220
.000
.004
.022
1.956
.020
1.758
.006
.546
.000
.014
.067
6.220
.055

5.025

Observed
Powerb
.832
1.000
.050
.282
.259
.113
.052
.694
.601

86
.327
94
93
a. R Squared = .163 (Adjusted R Squared = .094)
b. Computed using alpha = .05

Variable Definitions
Expand: Dependent variable representing intent to use an Expand the Agenda negotiation strategy
PerfEval: Categorical variable representing level of budget focus in manager performance evaluation (0 = low; 1 = high)
Interdep: Categorical variable representing level of interdependence between organizational units (0 = low; 1 = high)
AGRSPL: Categorical variable representing a median split of the Agreeableness personality dimension responses (0 = low; 1 = high)
PerfEval * Interdep: Interaction term representing interaction of Performance Evaluation and Interdependence variables
PerfEval * AGRSPL: Interaction term representing interaction of the Performance Evaluation and Agreeableness variables
Interdep * AGRSPL: Interaction term representing interaction of the Interdependence and Agreeableness variables
PerfEal * Interdep * AGRSPL: Interaction term representing three-way interaction between Performance Evaluation,
Interdependence, and Agreeableness
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The ANOVA results indicate a significant interaction between the interdependence
variable (Interdep) and the median-split Agreeableness variable (AGRSPL) with a p-value < .05
(Sig reported at .015) and the overall effect size, the impact of the independent variables on the
dependent variable, is moderate with a Partial Eta Squared, the proportion of the Sum of
Squares-Effect and Sum of Squares-Error attributable to the effect (Cohen 1973) of .067.
General rules of thumb for interpreting effect sizes, including eta-squared and partial etasquared, group effect sizes into three classifications: around .01 is considered small, around .06
is considered medium, and .14 is considered large (Cohen 2013). The noncentrality parameter
and observed power both attest to the power of the specific test to correctly reject a false null
hypothesis (Koele 1982).
H1 stipulated a negative impact from the interaction. A review of the means for each cell
support the directionality predicted. Thus H1 is supported.
Hypothesis H2 predicted a 3-way interaction between interdependence, budget focus in
performance evaluation (PerfEval), and agreeableness with a negative impact on intention to
utilize expand the agenda negotiation strategy. The three-way interaction term reported in Table
2 indicates a statistically significant three-way interaction between the variables (p-value < .05;
reported significance of .028). The partial eta squared of .055 is a moderate effect size (Cohen,
Cohen, West, and Aiken 2013). Thus H2 is supported.
However, a review of the 8 cell means in the 2X2X2 ANOVA shows a complex
interaction between the three independent variables on the dependent variable which may
warrant additional exploration. Of the 8 cell means, the two lowest, indicating lowest intention
to pursue an expand the agenda negotiation strategy, are the high performance evaluation/high
interdependence/high agreeableness cell and the low performance evaluation/high
interdependence/high agreeableness cell. Intriguingly as noted in Table 1, the high performance
evaluation/high interdependence/high agreeableness cell mean is greater than the low
performance evaluation/high interdependence/high agreeableness cell mean (3.563636 compared
to 3.214286).
Test of Hypotheses H3 and H4
Hypothesis H3 predicted a two-way interaction between interdependence and
agreeableness. However Table 4 indicates no statistically significant interaction between these
two variables. Reported p-value is .444. Therefore, hypothesis H3 is not supported. Hypothesis
H4 predicted a three-way interaction between interdependence, budget focus in performance
evaluation, and agreeableness with a positive impact on likelihood of using a problem solving
negotiation strategy. Table 4 indicates a statistically significant (p-value < .05, reported
significance of .029) interaction. The reported effect size is moderate (Partial Eta Squared of
.054) (Cohen 1973). The fields noncentrality parameter and observed power again report the
power of the individual test, the probability of correctly rejecting a null hypothesis which is in
fact false (Koele 1982).
A review of the means for each condition suggests the effect is in the correct direction.
Therefore, H4 is supported. Additionally, while not a hypothesis of this study, a significant
interaction between performance evaluation focus and organizational interdependence is
reported.
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Table 3

PerfEval

Interdep

0

0

1

Total

1

0

1

Total

Total

0

1

Total

Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: ProbSolv
AGRSPL
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

0
1
Total
0
1
Total

3.842857
4.163636
3.984000
3.950000
3.542857
3.690909

.628447
.488411
.582866
.520988
.510978
.540643

14
11
25
8
14
22

0
1
Total
0
1
Total
0
1
Total

3.881818
3.816000
3.846809
3.753846
3.909091
3.825000
4.000000
4.509091
4.243478

.581162
.582866
.576666
.643707
.836008
.725468
.511682
.372705
.511527

22
25
47
13
11
24
12
11
23

0
1
Total
0
1
Total
0
1
Total

3.872000
4.209091
4.029787
3.800000
4.036364
3.906122
3.980000
3.968000
3.973333

.585605
.702315
.658032
.625115
.680718
.654602
.502206
.662520
.590223

25
22
47
27
22
49
20
25
45

0
1
Total

3.876596
4.000000
3.938298

.577179
.664635
.622189

47
47
94
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Table 4
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: ProbSolv
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
PerfEval
Interdep
AGRSPL
PerfEval * Interdep
PerfEval * AGRSPL
Interdep * AGRSPL
PerfEval * Interdep *
AGRSPL
Error
Total
Corrected Total

Type III Sum
of Squares
6.958a
1431.247
.646
.158
.477
2.638
.804
.200
1.670
29.045
1493.960
36.002

df

Mean Square
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

F

.994
2.943
1431.247 4237.882
.646
1.912
.158
.467
.477
1.411
2.638
7.812
.804
2.381
.200
.591
1.670

4.944

.008
.000
.170
.496
.238
.006
.126
.444

Partial Eta
Squared
.193
.980
.022
.005
.016
.083
.027
.007

Noncent.
Parameter
20.601
4237.882
1.912
.467
1.411
7.812
2.381
.591

Observed
Powerb
.913
1.000
.277
.104
.217
.789
.332
.118

.029

.054

4.944

.594

Sig.

86
.338
94
93
a. R Squared = .193 (Adjusted R Squared = .128)
b. Computed using alpha = .05

Variable Definitions
ProbSolv: Dependent variable representing intent to use a Problem Solving negotiation strategy
PerfEval: Categorical variable representing level of budget focus in manager performance evaluation (0 = low; 1 = high)
Interdep: Categorical variable representing level of interdependence between organizational units (0 = low; 1 = high)
AGRSPL: Categorical variable representing a median split of the Agreeableness personality dimension responses (0 = low; 1 = high)
PerfEval * Interdep: Interaction term representing interaction of Performance Evaluation and Interdependence variables
PerfEval * AGRSPL: Interaction term representing interaction of the Performance Evaluation and Agreeableness variables
Interdep * AGRSPL: Interaction term representing interaction of the Interdependence and Agreeableness variables
PerfEal * Interdep * AGRSPL: Interaction term representing three-way interaction between Performance Evaluation,
Interdependence, and Agreeableness
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A review of the cell means reported in the descriptive statistics (Table 3) shows the cell
mean for the high performance evaluation, high interdependence, and high agreeableness
condition is the highest of all the cell means (4.509091). This suggests the combination of these
factors correlates with a greater intention to pursue a problem solving negotiation strategy
Discussion and Limitations
This study hypothesized the personality dimension agreeableness would interact with
organizational factors, specifically the degree of focus on meeting budget targets in a manager’s
performance evaluation and the level of interdependence to affect the likelihood of pursuing an
integrative negotiation strategy during budget negotiations. Results of hypotheses tests generally
support the predicted interactions. Such interactions provide important insight for managers
regarding how different individuals may approach sharing information in a budget negotiation.
Specifically, the results suggest more agreeable individuals will be more likely to pursue
negotiation strategies which work through the existing set of negotiation issues, seeking optimal
tradeoffs (a problem solving strategy) when the organization’s units are interdependent and their
own performance evaluation includes greater accountability for meeting budget targets.
However, the results also suggest more agreeable individuals will be significantly less likely to
bring new ideas into the budget negotiation (pursue an expand the agenda negotiation strategy)
when their organization’s units possess a greater level of interdependence.
Such insights provide significant value to both practice and the academy. Prior budget
research suggests obtaining information to coordinate firm interdependencies is a primary reason
firms involve subordinates in the budgeting process (Shields and Shields 1998). The results of
this study suggest both structural and behavioral factors affect the likelihood of achieving that
desired result. Thus, to achieve the intended outcomes for which unit managers were brought
into the budgeting process, managers will need to tailor their approach to the negotiations to
reflect both the specific circumstances of their firm and the individuality of the manager on the
other side of the negotiation.
Specifically, the results of this study suggest the generally other-focused personality
dimension agreeableness will interact with structural factors around the budgeting process in
important ways which affect the amount of information provided by unit managers. The results
suggest these individuals do respond to increased accountability with greater information
sharing. However, greater awareness of the connectivity between organizational units seems to
reduce their willingness to offer new ideas, but increases their willingness to work through issues
already present. So, while such managers in an organization with strong interdependencies
might not readily offer new ideas (expand the agenda) to address issues like resource shortages,
new revenue opportunities, and process bottlenecks, these results suggest they may offer greater
information and insights to work through them (problem solving) when already on the
negotiation table. Therefore, being aware of how particular managers respond to institutional
factors can help budget managers maximize the value of budget negotiations and ultimately help
improve firm performance and profitability.
Additionally, the results of this study offer potentially potent counterpoints to major
criticisms of the traditional budgeting process. A core criticism of the “Beyond Budgeting”
critique is that the use of budget targets for performance evaluation can create dysfunctional
performance incentives (Libby and Lindsay 2010). However, the results of this study suggest the
greater salience created by higher accountability for meeting budget targets may be an important
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component in eliciting greater information sharing. Specifically, highly agreeable individuals
express a greater intent to pursue a problem solving negotiation strategy in conditions of greater
organizational interdependence when meeting budget targets is a core component of their
performance evaluation. Thus, rather than reducing the amount of information provided by
participants, the greater salience and focus generated by making achieving budget targets part of
the performance evaluation process appears to increase the amount of information offered.
This work also provides several promising avenues for possible future research. While
this work focused on the personality dimension agreeableness, other personality dimensions may
impact responses to budget negotiation as well. Also, little focus in the extant literature around
budget negotiation has been paid to the negotiation strategies employed by participants. This
work contributes to the broader budgeting literature by introducing a budgeting application of the
theory developed in the generic negotiation literature and opens avenues for further development
of this theory within the unique budgeting context. Also, the three-way interaction between
performance evaluation, interdependence, and agreeableness’ relationship with intention to
pursue an expand the agenda negotiation strategy warrants further investigation.
Like all experimental studies, this study must be qualified with several limitations. First,
this study relied on participant responses to a role-play type case. The responses are only
generalizable to the extent that case elicited responses similar to those exhibited in an actual
work environment. No case can fully capture the richness and weight of an actual employment
situation. Secondly, the experiment drew participants from an online crowdsourcing
marketplace (Amazon’s MTurk). Again, the results of the study can only generalize to the extent
this marketplace of participants can approximate actual subordinate managers’ responses.
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